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I. INTRODUCTION
Consider the following situation. A relative of yours suddenly announces that she is getting married and invites you to her wedding,
which is to be held out of state in one week. You call your travel agent
and request a flight on your favorite airline, only to find that the airline
has gone out of business. You then ask the agent about a bargain fare
that you remember hearing advertised by a well-known airline, but the
agent tells you that the fare is not available, and quotes you a price of
$450.00 instead. This is expensive, but you realize that, because you are
buying the ticket with only a week's notice, the bargain fare must be
unavailable.
A week later, during the flight, you strike up a conversation with
the woman sitting next to you. She tells you she bought her ticket two
days ago for only $99.00. You also learn that two other airlines fly to
your destination, but your travel agent did not inform you of their existence, even though you requested a bargain fare.
Why has your travel agent misled you, and how can the airline you
are flying be allowed to advertise a low price fare, and then not deliver?
The answer lies in the development of airline-owned computer reservation systems, and the Department of Transportation's unwillingness and
inability to remedy competitive abuses of the systems.
This Article begins with a discussion of the development of computer reservation systems (CRSs) and their detrimental effect on competition and consumer interests after deregulation of the airline
industry.1 It then surveys the attempts of the Department of Transportation (DOT), the Department of Justice (DOJ), and Congress, to remedy the anti-consumer effects that have resulted from airline ownership
of CRSs, and criticizes those attempts as being ineffective. 2 Finally, this
Article concludes that, in the face of administrative and congressional
failure to remedy the anti-consumer effects of airlines' ownership of
CRSs, Congress should pass legislation that would restructure the air3
line industry by requiring airlines to divest their CRSs.
1. See infra text accompanying notes 52-102.
2. See infra text accompanying notes 103-389.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 390-515.
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II. BACKGROUND
A.

ORIGINS OF THE REGULATION OF AIRLINES

Although the federal government regulated aspects of the airline
industry as early as the 1920s, 4 it did not impose full-scale regulation
until the Civil Aeronautics Act (CAA) of 1934. 5 Congress passed the
CAA in response to the destabilizing affects of competition in the industry and the perception that the Great Depression was caused, in part, by
a failure of the free market. 6 The CAA created the Civil Aeronautics
Board (CAB) and granted it the authority to regulate fares and entry
into the industry.7 The economic regulation of the industry that began
with CAA, remained virtually unaltered under The Federal Aviation
ActS-the successor to the CAA. Under CAB regulation, national
routes were awarded by the CAB to "trunk line" airlines, and smaller
airlines flew on regional routes.9
Under regulation, the airline industry thrived and expanded for
forty years.'0 However, academics and leaders of the airline industry
began to question the efficiency of regulation;" consensus grew that the
12
industry would be more efficient without government regulation.
B.

DEREGULATION

Encouraged by successful airline deregulation at the state level in
Texas and California,' 3 Congress began to investigate the possibility of
deregulating the airline industry. 14 The House and Senate held hearings from 1970 to 1977.15 In 1978, the House and the Senate each passed
airline deregulation bills.16 After a conference, Congress enacted compromise legislation, the Airline Deregulation Act (ADA),'17 which was
designed to end government regulation of routes, fares, and entry into
the airline industry, and to create new administrative standards to pro4. See, e.g., Air Mail Act, Pub. L. No. 68-359, 43 Stat. 128 (1925).
5. Pub. L. No. 73-308, 48 Stat. 466 (1934).
6. Levine, Airline Competition in DeregulatedMarkets: Theory, Firm Strategy, and
Public Policy, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 393 (1987) [hereinafter Airline Competition].
7. Id. at 398.
8. Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731 (1958); Murphy, Airline Deregulationand Antitrust, 50 ANTITRUST L.J. 381 (1981).
9. Airline Competition,supra note 6, at 425-26.
10. Id. at 398.
11. Id. at 408.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 401.
14. Id. at 394.
15. S. REP. No. 631, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1978).
16. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1779, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 53-56 (1987).
17. Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978).
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tect public interest, convenience, and necessity. I8 The new standards
included a variety of adequate low price services; 19 the absence of unfair
and deceptive practices;2 0 a maximum reliance on market forces and
competition to provide needed air service; 2 ' a sound regulatory environment responsive to the needs of the public;22 the absence of predatory
practices; 2 3 the absence of unreasonable industry concentration;2 the
presence of competition or potential competition to encourage innovation and low prices;25 and an environment that encourages new entry
into, and expansion of, the air transportation market.26
The Act was intended to create a smooth transition from regulation
to deregulation.2 7 Thus, the regulatory functions of the CAB were
phased out over a period of six years.2 8 The CAB's authority over domestic routes ended on December 31, 1981,29 and the CAB's authority
over domestic fares ended on January 1, 1983.30 Finally, the CAB itself
disbanded in 1985. 31 However, some functions of the CAB, such as the
protection of the public interest, convenience, and necessity, with regard to air transportation for small communities, were transferred to
32
DOT.
Deregulation was beneficial to both airlines and consumers. In
1986, Brookings Institute conducted a study of the economic effects of
deregulation in the airline industry. The study concluded that deregulation had resulted in a $2.5 billion increase in annual profits to the airline industry, and an annual increase to the welfare of travelers worth
33
$6 billion.
18. H.R. REP. No. 1211, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3737, 3740-41.

19. 49 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(3) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
20. Id.
21. Id. § 1302(a)(4).
22. Id. § 1302(a)(5).
23. Id. § 1302(a)(7).
24. Id.
25. Id. § 1302(a)(9).
26. Id. § 1302(a)(10).
27. S. REP. No. 631, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 52 (1978).
28. 49 U.S.C. § 1551(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
29. Id.
30. Id. § 1551(a)(2).
31. Id. § 1551(a)(3).

32. Id. § 1551(b)(1)(A).
33. S. MORRISON & C. WINSTON, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF AIRLINE DEREGULATION
1-2 (1986) [hereinafter MORRISON].
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C. THE

FAILURE OF CONTESTABILITY IN THE DEREGULATED AIRLINE
INDUSTRY AND RESULTANT MARKET CONCENTRATION

Despite an overall increase in profits for the airline industry, some
individual airlines fared poorly, and eventually either failed or merged
with larger airlines, creating a trend towards concentration. 34
Opponents of deregulation had predicted that, initially, deregulation would generate fare wars, but that when the fare wars ended, both
new entrants into the industry, and inefficient airlines, each of whom
could have benefitted from the protection of regulation, would fail, and
market concentration would occur.35 Supporters of deregulation had
contended that, even if competition led to market concentration, prices
would remain competitive, under the theory of contestability. 36
The theory of contestability asserts that, even in markets with few
competitors, prices can be kept competitive if there is the threat of entry into the market by new firms; should prices rise too high,3 7 new
firms would be motivated to enter the market. In order for the theory
of contestability to apply to a market, a number of conditions must exist: (1) potential entrants must have the same access to technology as
the occupants of the market; (2) new entrants must be able to enter and
exit the market without large costs; and (3) they must be able to benefit
from the prices in the market for a reasonable amount of time after
38
entry.
Traditional industrial organization analysis focuses on physical bar39
riers to entry, capital mobility, set up costs, and economies of scale.
Because airplanes can be moved easily, and because a small airline, with
the ability to expand, can enter the market with several airplanes, proponents of deregulation thought that the airline industry was an ideal
proving ground for the theory of contestability. 4° However, deregulation proponents failed to consider the costs of communicating information to consumers about services and fares; 4' the costs of developing a
name and a reputation; 42 and the costs of persuading travel agents to
book flights.43 Therefore, proponents of deregulation and the theory of
contestability relied in their estimations on outmoded models of the airline industry, and failed to consider new technological developments, in34. See id. at 72-73.
35. Airline Competition,supra note 6, at 406.

36. Id. at 403-04.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 404.
Id.
Id. at 421.
Id.
Id. at 418.
Id. at 419.
Id.
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cluding the development of computer reservation systems. 44
The need for airlines in the deregulated airline industry to convey
information about themselves to consumers led to a greater role for
travel agents in the deregulated industry.45 It also became increasingly
important for the travel agent to pass the airlines' information on to the
consumer effectively. 46 To meet the needs of both the airlines and
travel agents, the agents began to use CRSs. 47 However, the CRSs were
owned by the dominant carriers in the industry, 48 and the carriers used
the systems "to adversely affect airline competition."4 9 One way the
carriers took advantage of their position was to implement biased display screens. 50 The systems presented schedules and fares in a manner
that made it "much easier for a travel agent to find and use services of
the system-owning airline ... than those of [the owning airline's] competitors. 5 1 Thus, the theory of contestability failed, and market concentration occurred.
44. Id. at 421.
45. Id. at 414-15.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 460.
48. Airline Computer Reservation Systems: Hearing Before the Senate Subcomm. on
Antitrust, Monopolies, and Business Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary,100th Cong.,
1st Sess. 142 (1987) [hereinafter Senate Hearing] (prepared statement of M.V. Scocozza).
The CRS industry in the United States consists of five major systems. American Airlines
owns the SABRE system; the Covia Corporation, a subsidiary of the Allegis Corporation,
which owns United Airlines, markets APOLLO; SystemOne Holdings, a subsidiary of the
Texas Air Corporation, which owns Eastern Airlines and Continental Airlines, owns SystemOne; the PARS Marketing Corporation, owned by Trans World Airlines and Northwest Airlines, owns and markets PARS; and Delta Airlines owns the DATAS II
SYSTEM. U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, PUB. No. DOT-P-37-88-2, STUDY OF AIRLINE
COMPUTER RESERVATION SYSTEMS 1 (1988) (available upon request from the Department
of Transportation) [hereinafter DOT STUDY]. Recently, Allegis announced plans to sell
50% of APOLLO to USAir, British Airways, Swissair, KLM, and Alitalia. Id. at 1 n.1.
SABRE is the largest CRS vendor, and APOLLO is the second largest. Id. at 20.
Prepared statements and testimony of the following Senate Hearing speakers will be
referred to infra: Edward R. Beauvais, Chairman of the Board, America West Airlines,
Inc., Tempe, Ariz.; Carl L Bryant, President, Mid-America Chapter, American Society of
Travel Agents, Columbus, Ohio; Michael A. Buckman, President, SABRE Travel Information Network, American Airlines, Dallas, Tex.; Michael E. Levine, General George Rogers
Clark Professor of Management, Yale University, New Haven, Conn.; AB. Magary, Executive Vice President for Marketing, Northwest Airlines, Minneapolis, Minn.; Senator
Howard M. Metzenbaum, Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust, Monopolies, and Business Rights, Ohio/Washington, D.C.; Richard E. Murray, President, SystemOne Corp., Texas Air Corp., Houston, Tex.; Matthew V. Scocozza, Assistant Secretary
for Policy & International Affairs, U.S. Department of Transportation; and David A.
Swankin, Consumer Federation of America, Washington, D.C.
49. Senate Hearing,supra note 48, at 142 (prepared statement of M.V. Scocozza).
50. Id. at 145.
51. Id.
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THE COMPUTER RESERVATION SYSTEM

A CRS consists of a central processing unit and terminals linked to
the unit by telephone lines.5 2 Travel agents maintain terminals in their
offices and make reservations for their customers through the terminals.5 3 The agents then issue the tickets through printers located in
their office. 54 The processing unit lists flights for the airline that owns
the CRS-the CRS airline-as well as the flights of other airlines.5 5
The CRS airline charges a booking fee to the airline whose flights are
booked on the CRS,56 and charges a subscription fee to the travel
57
agent.
Computer reservation systems were first developed while the airline industry was regulated.58 The entire industry began to develop an
industry-wide booking system,5 9 but the effort failed,6° and some airlines began to develop their own independent systems. 6 ' After deregulation, American's APOLLO system and United's SABRE system
emerged as the dominant systems in the market,6 2 although Continen63
tal's SystemOne eventually gained a moderate share of the market.
The CRSs provided many benefits to consumers, travel agents, and
airlines. Tickets were issued at a lower cost and at a greater volume
than under the prior manual system. Before computerized systems
were introduced, the travel agent would look up a fare in a book that
contained fare information, and then phone the chosen airline to book
the flight.6
E.

ANTI-COMPETITIVE BEHAVIOR OF THE CRS AIRLINES

Despite the actual and potential benefits of the CRS to the airline
industry, due to its exploitation by American and United, the CRS had
a number of detrimental effects on competition. American and United
exploited their ownership of CRSs by: (1) programming the CRSs to
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 141.
Id.
Airline Competition, supra note 6, at 415.
Senate Hearing,supra note 48, at 145 (prepared statement of M.V. Scocozza).

56. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 1985 REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE TO CONGRESS ON THE AIRLINE COMPUTER RESERVATION SYS. INDUS. 50 (available upon request

from the Department of Justice) [hereinafter
57. Id. at 50-51.
58. Airline Competition, supra note 6, at
59. Id. at 459-60.
60. Senate Hearing,supra note 48, at 246
61. Airline Competition, supra note 6, at
62. Id. at 415.
63. Senate Hearing,supra note 48, at 106
64. Airline Competition, supra note 6, at

DOJ REPORT].
459.
(testimony of A.B. Magary).
460.
(prepared statement of R.E. Murray).
458.
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discriminate against non-CRS airlines by limiting the display information that travel agents viewed, (2) charging high booking fees to nonCBS airlines, (3) entering into oppressive contracts with travel agents,
(4) misusing market data, and (5) manipulating travel agents through
the use of commission overrides. 65
1. Display Bias
Travel agents locate potential flights for consumers by entering the
customer's time and destination requests into the CRS.66 After the information is entered, the available flights appear on the travel agent's
computer screen. 67 The screen displays only eight flights at a time. 68 In
order to view additional flights, the agent must enter a command into
the computer.69 As a result, travel agents are likely to book consumers
70
on one of the flights listed on the first display.
CRS airlines listed all of their own flights on the first display and
relegated the flights of other airlines to lower listings. 71 Consequently,
travel agents using CRSs would book CRS airlines' flights more fre72
quently than those of non-CRS airlines.
2.

Booking Fees

The cost to a CRS airline of booking a non-CRS airline flight is between $0.33 and $0.66. 73 The CRS airlines charged booking fees of up to
$3.50, 74 charging the highest fees to direct competitors. 75 The CRS airlines then, as an incentive to book the flights of the CRS airlines, 76 used
77
booking profits to pay override commissions to travel agents.
3.

Oppressive Contracts with Travel Agents

Travel agents and the CRS airlines had unequal bargaining
power;78 therefore, CRS airlines were able to dictate the contract terms
under which the agents subscribed to the CRSs. 79 The contracts con65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 415.
See United Air Lines, Inc. v. C.A.B., 766 F.2d 1107, 1110 (7th Cir. 1985).
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Senate Hearing,supra note 48, at 245 (testimony of A.B. Magary).
DOJ REPORT, supra note 56, at 44.

Id.
Senate Hearing,supra note 48, at 207 (testimony of M.E. Levine).
Id.
Id. at 257 (prepared statement of C.L. Bryant).
Id. at 257-58. But see In re "Apollo" Air Passenger Computer Reservation Sys.
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tained liquidated damages clauses that, in effect, locked the travel
agents into the contracts,8 0 denying the agents the opportunity to sub8
scribe to the CRSs of new entrants into the CRS market. '
4. Misuse of Market Data
CRS airlines processed raw data gained from the CRSs to track the
performance of competitors.8 2 CRS airlines also obtained immediate information on the sales of rival airlines by accessing the data banks of
the central processing unit of the CRS.8 3 The CRS airlines calculated
discount ticket sales on the basis of the sales of rivals.8 4 For example, if
a CRS airline and a non-CRS airline both had bargain fares from City A
to City B, the CBS airline monitored the sales of the non-CRS airline,
and matched the rate of the non-CRS airline only until the non-CRS
airline had sold all of its bargain seats. After the bargain seats of the
non-CRS airline were sold, the CRS airline then raised the price of its
bargain seats.85
Moreover, CRS airlines monitored the booking patterns of travel
agents,8 6 and pressured them to book CBS airline flights in preference
87
to non-CRS airline flights.
5.

Commission Overrides

CRS airlines paid commission overrides to travel agents in order to
induce the agents to book the flights of CRS airlines rather than those
of competitors.8 8 Commission overrides worked similarly to frequent
flyer bonuses for consumers.8 9 If a travel agent booked a certain
number of flights on the CRS airline, she received monetary bonuses
and other benefits, such as free trips.9° Because of these overrides, the
(CRS), 720 F. Supp. 1061, 1064 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (travel agents and CRS airlines not of such
unequal bargaining power as to deprive travel agents of freedom of choice).
80. Senate Hearing,supra note 48, at 257 (prepared statement of C.L. Bryant). But

see United Air Lines, Inc. v. Austin Travel Corp., 867 F.2d 737, 740-41 (2d Cir. 1989) (liquidated damages clauses in APOLLO contracts reasonable and enforceable); Apollo, 720 F.
Supp. at 1063-64 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (liquidated damages clause in APOLLO contract not
unconscionable).
81. Senate Hearing,supra note 48, at 258 (prepared statement of C.L. Bryant).

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Idl at 112-13 (prepared statement of R.E. Murray).
Id. at 269 (testimony of D.A. Swankin).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 113 (prepared statement of R.E. Murray).
Id.
Airline Competition, supra note 6, at 456-57.

89. Id. at 457.

90. Id.
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agents provided slanted advice to consumers,9 1 who did not know that
92
they were receiving information from a biased source.

F. NEGATIVE EFFECTS

OF ABUSES OF

CRSs

The abuses by CRS airlines led to serious losses to rival airlines and
to consumers, 93 because non-CRS airlines were effectively barred from
some markets by the practices, 94 and because consumers were deprived,
by travel agents, of information on the lowest fares and the most convenient flights available. 95
G.

ATTEMPT BY NON-CRS AIRLINES TO DEVELOP A NEUTRAL
BOOKING SYSTEM

Alarmed by the dominance that the CRS airlines were exerting
over both the CRS industry and the airline industry, the International
Air Transportation Association formed the Neutral Industry Booking
System (NIBS) interest group in June 1985. 96 Thirty United States and
foreign airlines 97 formed the group to develop an unbiased CRS that
could compete with the systems of United and American. 98 The Department of Justice noted the formation of the NIBS project 99 and expressed hope that the project could erode the dominance exercised by
United and American in the CRS industry.1°0 However, the NIBS project was unsuccessful, 10 1 and United and American continued to domi10 2
nate the industry.
91. Id.
92. Senate Hearing,supra note 48, at 211 (testimony of M.E. Levine).
93. See MORRISON, supra note 33, at 69.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Mifsud, Computer Reservations Systems and Automated Market Distributionin a
DeregulatedAviation Industry, 1 J.L. & TECH. 143, 151 (1986).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. DOJ REPORT, supra note 56, at 28-31.
100. Id.
101. Senate Hearing,supra note 48, at 246 (testimony of A.B. Magary). Earlier attempts to market a neutral industry-wide CRS also failed. Between 1967 and 1976 the
Donnelly Official Airline System, the Automated Travel Agency Reservation System, the
Joint Industry Computerized Reservation System, and the MAARS Systems all failed. 54
Fed. Reg. 38,871 (1989).
102. Senate Hearing,supra note 48, at 246 (testimony of A.B. Magary).

12
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III. ADMINISTRATIVE ATTEMPTS TO REMEDY
ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF AIRLINE
OWNERSHIP OF CRS
A. CAB

RULEMAKING

In the early 1980s, complaints by non-CRS airlines and travel
agents about the behavior of CRS airlines began to deluge Congress. 0 3
Congress directed DOJ and CAB to investigate the complaints.'i 4 CAB
announced a rulemaking, and invited comments. On July 27, 1984, CAB
05
issued its final rules, accompanied by an opinion.'
In the opinion, CAB found that CRS airlines had market power
over the CRS industry,10 6 and that they were using the market power
to restrain competition in the airline industry. 0 7 CAB reasoned that
the CRS airlines had charged booking fees to non-CRS airlines that
were not based on the cost of service,' 08 CRS airlines had engaged in
display bias,' 0 e and had intentionally manipulated air competition."i 0
These were all examples of the exercise of market power."'
The opinion also found that the CRS airlines had engaged in monopoly leveraging" i 2 by using power in the CRS market to gain an advantage in the air transportation market. 1 3 Further, the opinion found
that barriers to entry existed in the CRS market" 4 because CRS airlines earned incremental revenues through the use of display" bias." 5
Because independent CRS companies were not able to earn such incre6
mental revenues, they were unable to compete."
The opinion found that the relevant product market was CRS information services," 7 and not airline ticket distribution services," 8 because the CRSs were more efficient than other ticket booking
methods,"i 9 and were more desirable to the public than non-computer103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

United Air Lines, Inc. v. C.A.B., 766 F.2d 1105, 1110 (7th Cir. 1985).
Id.
See 49 Fed. Reg. 32,540 (1984).
Id. at 32,542.
Id.
Id. at 32,543.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 32,546.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 32,544.
Id.
Id.
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ized systems. 120 Furthermore, the opinion found the relevant geographic market was regional, not national,' 21 because few sales were
made by a CRS outside of its dominant regional market,12 2 and because
3
CRS airlines perceived their markets to be regional.12
The CAB noted that the CRS airlines controlled an essential facility,124 and that under the Essential Facility Doctrine, the CRS airlines
were obligated to share the CRSs with non-CRS airlines on a reasonable and non-discriminatory basis.'25
The CAB also held that display bias was an unfair and deceptive
practice'2 6 within the meaning of section 411 of the Federal Aviation
Act. 127 Display bias injured consumers by depriving them of opportunities to take advantage of lower fares' 2s and by causing them to take less
convenient flights.'29 Bias deceived consumers,'130 who expected to re13
ceive neutral information from travel agents. '
Although CAB did not pass any rules prohibiting liquidated dam132
ages clauses in contracts between CRS airlines and travel agents,'
CAB noted that it found the clauses troubling. 1 33 Nevertheless, it decided against passing any rules on this issue,' 34 noting that it would be
difficult to devise a liquidated damages formula that would be appropriate for all contracts, 35 and that courts were better suited to this task
than the CAB.' 3 6 The CAB also reasoned that the rules against exclusivity clauses and contracts that lasted more than five years would offset any negative consequences that resulted from liquidated damages
13 7
clauses.
39
38
CAB rejected this option,
CAB also considered divestiture.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 32,546.

Id.
Id. at 32,547.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 32,548.
Id.
Id. at 32,556.
Id.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 32,560.
Id.
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noting that divestiture would involve time-consuming adjudication, 14°
and would involve greater government intervention than was desirable. 141 It also reasoned that vertical integration of CRS services into
airline companies might create an efficiency not otherwise attainable. 14
In its rules, the CAB imposed four major prohibitions on the CRS
airlines. First, CRS airlines were prohibited from displaying flights on
14 3
CRS screens in a format that created bias based on carrier identity.
Second, CRS airlines were prohibited from charging discriminatory
booking fees to non-CRS airlines. 1' Third, CRS airlines were prohibited from entering contracts with travel agents that lasted for more
than five years, 145 or that required exclusive use of the CRS by the
travel agent. 1' Finally, CRS airlines were prohibited from maintaining
47
market data that they did not make available to non-CRS airlines.
United contested the rules in federal court, 148 challenging the
CAB's statutory authority to promulgate rules, 149 contending that the
CAB's antitrust analysis was arbitrary and capricious, 150 and charging
that the CAB had violated procedural provisions of the Administrative
Procedure Act.151 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in a decision
152
by Judge Posner, upheld the rules despite all of United's challenges.
After the demise of CAB in 1985, DOT assumed jurisdiction for en153
forcement of the rules.
B.

CONTROVERSY OVER COMPLIANCE WITH THE
CAB RULES BY CRS AIRLINES

Shortly after CAB promulgated the rules in 19 8 4 ,1M CRS airlines
soon were accused of developing means to avoid the letter and spirit of
the CAB rules. CRS airlines discontinued overt CRS display bias, 155
but began to underestimate the projected elapsed flying times of their
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 32,563 (codified at 14 C.F.R. § 255.4 (1984)).
Id. (codified at 14 C.F.R. § 255.5 (1984)).
Id. (codified at 14 C.F.R. § 255.6 (1984)).
Id.
Id. (codified at 14 C.F.R. § 255.8 (1984)).
United Air Lines, Inc. v. C.A.B., 766 F.2d 1005 (7th Cir. 1985).
Id. at 1111.
Id. at 1116.
Id.
Id. at 1122.
49 U.S.C. § 1302 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
49 Fed. Reg. 32,540 (1984).

155. Senate Hearing,supra note 48, at 101 (prepared statement of R.E. Murray).
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flights. 156 Because the priority of the flight on the CRS display was determined by shortness of flying time, 57 the flights of the CRS airlines
again appeared at the top of the screens.' 1 CRS airlines also were accused of giving preference on the screens to their own connecting
flights, 5 9 refusing to display all classes of service offered by rival air161
lines, 160 and biasing the display to favor their hubs.
The CRS airlines' responses to the rules against price discrimination for booking fees was to raise the booking fees for all non-CRS airlines.' 62 The new booking fee charged was set at well above cost. 6 3
The CRS airlines were accused of avoiding the prohibition against
contracts with travel agents lasting for more than five years by using
"rollover clauses."'16 4 These clauses stated that the contract was to be
renewed each time that a travel agent acquired a new piece of equipment from a CRS airline.' 65 Thus, if a travel agent three years into a
contract ordered a new printer for her CRS, the contract would automatically be renewed for another five years. The CRS airlines avoided
the rule against exclusivity clauses in contracts with travel agents by
adopting minimum use clauses. 166 The minimum standard for agent use
67
of a CRS was high enough to act as a de facto exclusivity clause.'
As required by the CAB rules, CRS airlines shared market data
with non-CRS airlines. 6 8 However, the CRS airlines provided the data
only in the form of raw computer tapes, 169 which the non-CRS airlines
claimed were difficult and expensive for the non-CRS airlines to process.' 7 0 Also, non-CRS airlines accused the CRS airlines of continuing
to monitor the sales of rivals on a minuteby-minute basis through the
CRS data banks, something the non-CRS airlines lacked the ability to
do.171
Despite the concern expressed by the CAB opinion about the ef156.
157.
158.
159.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

101-02.
101-02.
102.
213 (testimony of M.E. Levine).

160. DOJ REPORT, supra note 56, at 33-34.

161. Senate Hearing,supra note 48, at 213 (testimony of M.E. Levine).
162. Id. at 186-87 (testimony of E.R. Beauvais).
163. Id. at 188.
164. Id. at 104 (prepared statement of R.E. Murray).

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id.
Id. at 261 (prepared statement of C.L. Bryant).
Id.
Id. at 218 (prepared statement of M.E. Levine).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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fects of liquidated damages clauses, 172 the CRS airlines used even more
oppressive liquidated damages clauses in their contracts with travel
agents. 173 Under the new clauses, if a travel agent wished to switch to
another CRS, liquidated damages consisted not only of future rental
fees and removal costs, but also of lost booking revenue to the CRS airline over the remainder of the contract term.174 The damages under
this formula amounted to as much as $450,000,175 which was more than
most travel agents could pay.176 Some travel agents, asserting that the
clauses were unenforceable because they imposed penalties rather than
an approximation of actual damages, 177 challenged the legality of the
clauses in court. 178 However, travel agents complained that, due to the
179
unequal economic power of the travel agents and the CRS airlines,
80
the agents were unable to litigate the issue to a full resolution.
The CRS airlines vehemently denied the accusations aimed at
them, contending that they had complied in full with the rules, and that
they were charging reasonable booking fees to non-CRS airlines. The
CRS airlines also denied that they were accessing CRS data banks in order to monitor the sales of rivals. Nonetheless, the fact remained that
the CAB rules did little to erode the position of United and American
either in the airline market or in the CRS market.
C.

STUDY BY

DOJ

DOJ undertook a study in 1985181 to determine whether the CAB
rules had remedied the anti-competitive effects of airline ownership of
CRSs. 8 2 In its report, DOJ found that the rules had not been effective, 8 3 and that the CRS airlines continued to possess market power
i 4
over the CRS industry.1
On the other hand, the report also found that the changes in entry
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

49 Fed. Reg. 32,540, at 32,556 (1984).
Airline Competition, supra note 6, at 488.
Id.
Senate Hearing,supra note 48, at 261 (testimony of C.L. Bryant).
Id. at 263.
See id. at 261.
Id.

179. Id. at 167 (testimony of A.B. Magary). But see In re "Apollo" Air Passenger Com-

puter Reservation Sys. (CRS), 720 F. Supp. 1061 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
180. Senate Hearing, supra note 48, at 107-09 (prepared statement of R.E. Murray).
On the other hand, some travel agents defended to a conclusion suits brought by CRS airlines to enforce liquidated damages clauses and lost. See United Air Lines, Inc. v. Austin
Travel Corp., 867 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1989); Apollo, 720 F. Supp. 1061.
181. DOJ REPORT, supra note 56, at 2.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
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conditions caused by the CAB rules improved the prospects for entry of
an independent CRS company, 85 because the rules had prohibited: (1)
bias on the display screens of the CRSs, 186 (2) contracts of more than
five years between agents and CRS airlines, 8 7 and (3) exclusivity agreements. 188 Even so, the report indicated that the possibility of entry into
the CRS industry by an independent company, although improved, was
still uncertain. 189 The report further noted that: (1) airline-owned
CRSs contained the most reliable information about the CRS airline, 190
(2) liquidated damages clauses discouraged travel agents from changing
to systems of new entrants,191 and (3) the costs of developing a new
192
CRS were high.
The report also noted that the CRS airlines may have reintroduced
bias into their CRSs 193 by refusing to display all classes of service of195
fered by non-CRS airlines, 194 by favoring the hubs of CRS airlines,
by favoring CRS airline connecting flights over the flights of non-CRS
airlines, 196 and by shaving flying times in order to gain listings at the
top of the CRS screens. 197 Even so, the report concluded that new rules
should not be promulgated by DOT, 98 and that bias could be controlled
through enforcement of the existing rules. 199
The report discussed complaints from non-CRS airlines charging
that CRS airlines did not provide market data in a timely fashion,2° °
20 1
that they provided data in raw form that took too long to process,
and that the CRS airlines were able to monitor the activities of their
rivals by accessing the CRS data banks.20 2 However, the report concluded that the abuses did not constitute a competitive problem 20 3 because access to marketing data was not essential for an airline to
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

15.
19.
20.
21.
22.
27.
32.
33-34.
36.

196. Id. at 35.

197. Id. at 37.
198. Id. at 38.

199. Id.
200. Id. at 40.

201. Id. at 42.
202. Id. at 50.

203. Id. at 42.
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compete, 20 4 and because airlines had alternate sources of
205
information.
The report discussed the possibility that the booking fees charged
to non-CRS airlines could have anti-competitive effects.2 °6 The report
concluded that it was unclear whether CRS airlines charged supra-competitive fees, 20 7 although it noted that because CRS airlines possessed
large market shares of the CRS industry,208 and because barriers to entry existed,209 the fees possibly were supra-competitive.2 10 However,
the report indicated that DOJ preferred new entry into the CRS industry as a remedy to supra-competitive booking fees, 211 rather than regulation of the fees.21 2 The report argued that it would be impossible to
determine a competitive price for the fees, 2 13 and that fee regulation
214
would require extensive supervision.
The report also discussed divestiture as an option.21 5 The report indicated that divestiture would break down entry barriers to the CRS
market2 16 and would end unwarranted advantages that CRS airlines
2 17
may have attained in the airline market through the use of CRSs.
However, the report also listed many factors that could make divestiture costly, noting that divestiture would result in duplication of
software, 218 hardware,2 19 data bases,220 staffs,22 1 programmers2 2 2 and
telecommunications lines. 223 The report also noted that there would be
no benchmark by which to compute fair compensation to the CRS airlines for the CRSs, 224 and that even if independent companies acquired
the CRSs, travel agents, in order to receive commission overrides, might
seek systems biased toward the dominant carrier in the travel agent's
204. Id.
205. Id. at 42-43.

206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

Id. at 43.
Id. at 46.
Id.
Id.
Id.

211. Id. at 55.

212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 59.
at 55.
at 64.
at
at
at
at
at

64-65.
70.
69.
71.
73.

at 72.
at 75.
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market.2 2 5 Therefore, the report did not recommend divestiture.
STUDY BY THE GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE

D.

In response to a congressional request, the General Accounting Office (GAO) also conducted a study to examine the effects of airlineowned CRSs on competition in the airline industry. 226 The GAO found
that the booking fees charged by CRS airlines might be anti-competitive,227 and that the profit reports received from CRS airlines were of
poor quality. 228 The GAO also found evidence that the CRS airlines
had market power over the CRS industry.2 - GAO urged DOT to study
further the possible anti-competitive effects of airline-owned CRSs in
the airline industry 230 and to enforce or strengthen rules governing
231
CRSs.
E.

DOT ACTION AFTER THE SUNSET OF CAB

After the sunset of CAB in 1985,232 DOT took over CAB's authority
to protect the public interest, convenience, and necessity,2 33 and to pre2s4
vent actual, incipient, and policy violations of the antitrust laws.
Despite the recommendations of DOJ and GAO that DOT rigorously enforce the CAB rules, DOT took a non-interventionist stance regarding regulation of the airline industry. DOT completed its own
study of the CRS industry in 1988,235 which concluded that economies
of scale and scope that CRS airlines enjoyed made new entrants into
the CRS industry unlikely;23 6 that the booking fees charged by CRS airlines far exceeded cost;23 7 that non-CRS airlines had little ability to influence the level of booking fees;23 8 and that CRS airlines made very
large profits from computer reservation systems.2 39 Despite its conclusions, DOT did little to prevent anti-competitive behavior by the CRS
airlines. Although DOT promulgated some rules, such as a prohibition
225. Id. at 45.
226. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, No. GAO/RCED-86-74, AIRLINE COMPETITION: IMPACT OF COMPUTERIZED RESERVATION SYSTEMS

227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

Id. at 12.
Id. at 13.
Id.
Id. at 14.
Id.
49 U.S.C. § 1553 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
Id. § 1302.
14 C.F.R. § 224 (1984).
DOT STUDY, supra note 48.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 105.
Id. at 90.
Id. at 88.

(1986).
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against listing false flying times,240 DOT failed to prevent display
bias, 24 1 failed to prohibit rollover clauses and minimum use clauses in
contracts between CRS airlines and travel agents, 2 42 and failed to pre-

vent misuse of market data by the CRS airlines. 24 3 Under pressure
from the House Aviation Subcommittee, which held a hearing on airline
ownership of CRSs on September 14, 1988,24 4 DOT initiated a rulemaking to review the CAB rules on September 21, 1989.245 DOT's rulemaking, however, offered little hope that DOT would act to remedy anticompetitive conditions caused by airline ownership of CRSs. Representatives of DOT indicated at the House Aviation Subcommittee hearing
that DOT did not have immediate plans or target dates to remedy the
anti-competitive aspects of airline ownership of CRSs that it had noted
246
in its 1988 study of the CBS industry.
IV.

CONGRESSIONAL ATTEMPTS TO REMEDY THE ANTICOMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF AIRLINE-OWNED CRSs
AND TO SPUR ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION
A.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

In 1983, shortly before the CAB rulemaking, 247 the House Aviation
Subcommittee held hearings on the issue of airline ownership of
CRSs. 248 Afterwards, the leadership of the subcommittee wrote a letter
to CAB requesting rules to prohibit anti-competitive uses of CRSs by
CRS airlines. 249 The subcommittee remained dissatisfied, even after the
240. Id.
241. Senate Hearing,supra note 48, at 185-86 (prepared statement of E.R. Beauvais).
242. Id. at 257 (prepared statement of C.L. Bryant).
243. Id. at 269 (prepared statement of D.A. Swankin).
244. Airline Computer Reservation Systems: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the Comm. on Public Works and Transportation,House of Representatives, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1988) [hereinafter House Hearing].
245. 54 Fed. Reg. 38,870 (1989).
246. House Hearing,supra note 244, at 103. Representatives of DOT stated that immediate action to remedy the anti-competitive aspects of airline ownership of CRSs was not
warranted for a number of reasons. First, DOT stated that there was intense competition
for travel agents CRS vendors. Id. at 83 (testimony of Hon. Robert L. Pettit, Associate
Deputy Secretary of the Department of Transportation). Second, there was a trend toward CRS ownership by former non-CRS airlines. Id. at 84. Third, DOT had been unable
to determine the net revenue that CRS airlines obtained from CRSs, because of the complexity of the cost transactions between CRS airlines and CRS customers. Id. at 87-89.
Mr. Mineta, Chairman of the House Aviation Subcommittee, was unpersuaded by DOT's
reasoning, and indicated "a degree of frustration" with DOT's inaction. Id. at 105 (statement of Hon. Norman Y. Mineta).
247. H.R. REP. No. 293, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1987).
248. Id.
249. Id.
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promulgation of the CAB rules in 1984.25 Later, the members of the
House Public Works Committee wrote to DOT requesting action. 5 2'
However, DOT did not take any action in response to the request,

and, as a result, two bills were subsequently introduced in the House to
253
deal with DOT's inaction.
1.

Airline Computer Reservation Systems ArbitrationAct
Representatives Mineta, Hammerschmidt, and Gingrich introduced

the Airline Computer Reservation Systems Arbitration Act2

4

on Feb-

ruary 24, 1987. The bill was intended to require arbitration of disputes
255
involving CRS contracts.
The bill established a procedural mechanism for the arbitration of a
CRS contract clause, if the clause affected at least one-third of the
travel agents or one-third of the non-CRS airlines which had contractual relationships with CRS airlines. 25 If a travel agent submitted a petition to the Federal Mediation and Reconciliation Service (FMCS) to
rule on the enforceability of a contract clause, the CRS airline was to be
given thirty days to inform FMCS of the number of travel agents affected by the clause.2 57 If either one-third of the travel agents affected
by the clause or one hundred travel agents-whichever was lower-petitioned FMCS for arbitration of the clause, the clause was to be submitted for binding arbitration to determine whether the contract clause
was consistent with normal business practice, or whether it was in force
as a result of monopoly power exercised by the CRS airline. 25 8 If a nonCRS airline submitted a petition, airlines that accounted for one-third
of the yearly domestic scheduled passenger miles for the industry were
required to join the petition in order to trigger arbitration. 259 The
FMCS was to set the ground rules for the arbitration and to appoint the
250. Id. at 8-9.

251. Id. at 8.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 8-9. The House Aviation Subcommittee also met on September 14, 1988, to
consider the Department of Transportation's May 1988 report on the airline computer reservations systems industry, and on whether any action was needed to follow up on the
DOT report. At the 1988 hearing, the Aviation Subcommittee did not consider any legislation. House Hearing,supra note 244, at 2.
254. H.R. 1217, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 133 CONG. REc. E570-71 (1987). Earlier versions
of the bill were introduced in 1986 and 1985. See 132 CONG. REC. E2967-69 (daily ed. Aug.
15, 1986); 132 CONG. REC. H6432 (daily ed. Aug. 15, 1986).
255. 133 CONG. REC. E571 (1987) (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1987) (statement of Mr. Mineta).
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id.
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arbitrators. 260 The Airline Computer Reservations Systems Arbitration
Act attracted little support and was not considered by any committee in
the House.
2. Airline PassengerProtectionAct
On October 5, 1987, the Airline Passenger Protection Act 261 was introduced by Representative Mineta and forty-six co-sponsors. The
House version of the bill (1) prohibited the use of elapsed flying time to
determine the order-of-flight display on CRS screens;26 2 (2) prohibited
liquidated damages clauses in contracts between CRS airlines and travel
agents, allowing damages only for remaining lease fees and removal
costs of CRS airlines;263 (3) prohibited rollover clauses; 26 and (4) lim2 6s
ited booking fees to the costs of collecting and displaying information.
The bill passed the House and was received in the Senate. 26 6 The
Senate insisted on substantial amendments and requested a conference.26 7 However, the House disagreed with the Senate amendments,
and Congress was unable to reach a compromise before it recessed in
December 1987.
B.

SENATE

1. Airline PassengerProtectionAct
The Senate passed its own version of the Airline Passenger Protection Act in October 1987.268 The main provisions of the Senate bill required airlines to report information about airline flight delays and
baggage complaints to consumers. 269 However, the bill also contained
provisions requiring the Secretary of Transportation to develop a
formula for computing the average elapsed flying time for each flight
displayed on a CRS, 270 and required that no airline list a flight time
shorter than the one formulated by DOT.27 1 Further, the bill required
that CRSs display the on-time performance of each flight listed on a
260. Id. at 3-4.
261. H.R. 3051, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 16, 133 CONG. REC. H8113 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1987).
262. Id. at 18, 133 CONG. REC. H8115-16.
263. Id. at 18, 21, 133 CONG. REC. H8117.

264. Id.
265. Id.
266. 133 CONG. REC. H8125 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1987) (passed the House); id. at S15427
(daily ed. Oct. 5, 1987) (received in the Senate).

267.
268.
269.
270.

Id. at S15534 (statement of Sen. Ford).
S. 1485, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 133 CONG. REc. S15530 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1987).
133 CONG. REC. S15527 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1987) (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum).
S. 1485, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 13, 133 CONG. REC. S15530-31 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1987).

271.

Id., 133 CONG. REC. S15530.
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CRS,272 and that CRS-airlines charge reasonable fees for loading this
information into the CRS. 273
2. Hearings Before the Senate Antitrust Subcommittee
On December 19, 1987, the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust, Monopolies and Business Rights held a hearing, chaired by Senator Metzenbaum, on the issue of airline ownership of CRSs.274 Options
discussed at the hearing were: (1) legislative prohibition of liquidated
damages clauses;275 (2) mandatory disclosure by travel agents to consumers of commission overrides;276 (3) informal negotiation between
DOT and the CRS airlines; 277 and (4) enforced divestiture by airlines of
CRSs.27 8 The subcommittee did not consider any legislation at the

hearing.

279

V.

ANALYSIS

Since the disbanding of CAB, the response of DOJ and DOT to the
anti-competitive effects of airline ownership of CRSs has been sporadic
and has resulted in ineffectual regulation. The response of Congress
has been to carp at the agencies from time to time and to introduce occasional legislation to compensate for agency inaction.
These approaches are doomed to fail. DOT has proved unwilling to
engage in close supervision of the CRS industry. Even if it were willing,
it would probably be unable to regulate quickly enough to stay abreast
of new technological developments. 28 0 Congress is also ill-equipped to
regulate the CS industry. 28 ' There is only one way to protect the consumer from the CRS airlines and from the costs of ineffectual regulation. Congress must restructure the airline industry, through
divestiture.
A.

CRITICISM OF

DOJ

REPORT

The DOJ report, which studied the effectiveness of the CAB rules
passed in 1984 to remedy anti-competitive abuses of the CRS by CRSairlines, concluded that the rules had been ineffective, and that the
272. Id. at 13-14, 133 CONG. REC. S15530-31.
273. Id.
274. See Senate Hearing,supra note 48.

275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.

Id. at 263-64 (prepared statement of C.L. Bryant).
Id. at 219 (prepared statement of M.E. Levine).
See id. at 151 (prepared statement of M.V. Scocozza).
Id. at 2 (opening statement of Sen. H.M. Metzenbaum).
Id.
See id. at 218 (prepared statement of M.E. Levine).
See id.
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CRS-airlines continued to possess market power in the CRS industry.
Despite this finding, DOJ failed to recommend action to remedy the
anti-competitive effects of airline ownership of CRSs. DOJ's inaction
stemmed from erroneous conclusions about conditions in the airline
industry.
First, DOJ underestimated the anti-competitive effects that resulted from the CBS airlines' superior access to market data. CRS airlines have used the data to develop strategies that maintain their
dominance in the airline market as well as in the CRS market. 28 2 True,
this data is available to the non-CRS airlines, but only at a high price
and in raw form. 28 3 Further, the non-CRS airlines do not have the
same ability as the CRS airlines to develop the computer capabilities to
effectively process the data.28 4 The CRS airlines have also exploited
their ability to obtain immediate information on the sales of their rivals
through the CRS central processing unit. 28 5 The CRS airlines use the
information to adjust their own fares from minute to minute, according
to how many seats are available on the non-CRS airline. 28 6 The nonCRS airline must set a definite number of seats to be sold at discount
rates because they do not have the means to monitor the sales of rival
airlines. 28 7 Not only does this put non-CRS airlines at a great disadvantage, 288 but it also disadvantages consumers because they cannot depend
28 9
on obtaining advertised low fares from CRS airlines.
Second, the report failed to recognize that booking fees charged by
CRS airlines are probably supra-competitive. The report concluded that
it was not clear whether booking fees were supra-competitive,2 ° and
that the answer to this question would depend on the methodology used
to compute the costs of booking the flights. 291 However, DOJ's finding
that the CBS airlines possessed market power in the CRS industry
should have led them to recommend a rulemaking by DOT on the issue
of the competitiveness of booking fees. DOJ's reliance on new entrants
into the CPS market as a remedy for booking fees that DOJ suspected
were supra-competitive was naive, in view of its findings that new entry
into the market was uncertain.
282. Id. at 207.
283. Airline Competition,supra note 6, at 461.

284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Senate Hearing,supra note 48, at 172 (prepared statement of D.A. Swankin).
DOJ REPORT, supra note 56, at 46.
Id. at 52.
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B.

CRITICISM OF DOT FAILURE TO PROTECT PUBLIC INTEREST,
CONVENIENCE, AND NECESSITY, AND TO ENFORCE ANTITRUST
LAWS IN THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY

In debates on the Senate floor, Senator Kennedy, summarizing the
congressional intent behind the Airline Deregulation Act (ADA), indicated that Congress intended the bill to implement regulation that
would allow market forces to act unimpeded:
The bill itself is complex and technical, but the theme is simple: Open
the air transportation industry to the rigors of competition and benefits

will flow to the carriers, the consumer, and the taxpayer. This is
achieved by creating a regulatory policy framework that relies on competitive market forces to provide lower fares and better air service, and
by specifically allowing the carriers for the first time ever to compete
in price and to gain easier entry into markets.

292

However, DOT has proved unwilling to promulgate regulations that
effectuate the purpose of the ADA, and DOT has ignored the pro-consumer policies that were behind Congress' passage of the ADA. Moreover, DOT has failed to enforce the CAB rules which were promulgated
in order to prevent anti-competitive abuse of the CRS by the CRS-airlines. DOT has thus failed to implement the congressionally mandated
standards for the public interest, convenience, and necessity, as set
293
forth in the ADA.
94
1. Adequate Low Price Service-

The ADA demonstrates Congress' intent that the market determine the level of prices and services for the consumer, in an atmosphere of fair competition. 295 However, DOT has failed to prevent the
CRS airlines from monitoring the sales of rivals296 and then offering
low fares only until rivals sell out their discount fares.297 Therefore,
the consumer is not able to rely on consistent availability of advertised
low fares from CRS airlines.
2.

Unfair and Deceptive Practices

9s

DOT has allowed display bias to continue,299 which, according to
292. 124 CONG. REc. 37,418 (1978) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
293. 49 U.S.C. § 1302 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
294. Id. § 1302(a)(3).
295. H.R. REP. No. 1211, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5, 55, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3737, 3740-41, 3774.
296. Airline Competition,supra note 6, at 463.
297. Id. at 462.
298. 49 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(7) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
299. See Senate Hearing,supra note 48, at 101-03 (prepared statement of R.E. Murray).

COMPUTER/LAW JOURNAL

(Vol. X

the now defunct CAB, is an unfair and deceptive practice." For example, DOT has tolerated CRS airlines' refusal to display all classes of service available on rival airlines. 30 ' DOT has also allowed CRS airlines to
bias screens towards CRS-airline connecting flights, even if the flight of
30 2
a rival airline would provide a shorter layover time to the consumer.
Although the DOJ report indicated that these practices probably violate
the CAB rules,30 3 DOT has failed to implement enforcement
proceedings.
3. PredatoryPractice

304

A further violation of congressional policy which has gone unremedied by DOT is the unreasonable increase in booking fees. The
legislative history of the ADA indicates that predatory behavior should
be remedied by DOT. 30 5 However, DOT has not attempted to remedy
the CRS airlines' predatory behavior of charging unreasonably high
booking fares as a result of their market power.
3

4. Market Concentration 06
Market concentration in the airline industry has occurred, in part,
307
because of the advantages that certain airlines gain by using CRSs.
The legislative history of the ADA indicates that DOT was supposed to
regulate the airline industry in order to prevent market concentration.30 8 However, DOT has, on the contrary, tolerated anti-competitive
exploitation of the CRS by the two dominant carriers in the airline industry, American and United. 30 9 As a result, for the period of time
DOT has been responsible for regulation of the airline industry, the in31 0
dustry has become even more concentrated.
300. 49 Fed. Reg. 32,540, at 32,548 (1984).
301. DOJ REPORT, supra note 56, at 33-34.
302. Id. at 35.
303. Id. at 38.
304. 49 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(7) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
305. H.R. REP. No. 1211, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 9, 98, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 3737, 3745, 3808.
306. 49 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(7) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
307. Airline Competition,supra note 6, at 464.
308. H.R. REP. No. 1211, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6, 55-56, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3737, 3740-41, 3774-75.
309. Senate Hearing,supra note 48, at 246 (prepared statement of A.B. Magary).
310. 133 CONG. REC. S15527 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1987) (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum).
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5. Regulatory Environment to EncourageInnovation and
31
Expansion 1
DOT has also tolerated a business environment that reduces incentives for innovations in the CRS industry. Because the CRS airlines
have market power over the CRS industry, possible new entrants lack
incentive to develop the technology of the product. 312 Moreover, new
air carriers hesitate to enter the air transportation market because to do
so is perilous without the benefit of CRS ownership.3 13 In addition, independent CRS companies also hesitate to enter the CRS market because they are unable to gain incremental revenue through the use of
display bias, as do the CRS airlines. 314 Consequently, without cross-subsidization from airline profits, an independent CRS company cannot
compete with the CRS airlines in the CRS market.
6. Antitrust Violations
CAB is empowered to prevent violations of antitrust laws in the
airline industry,315 violations of the policies behind the laws, 316 and in317
cipient violations of the laws.

An exhaustive antitrust analysis of the CRS industry would be
outside the scope of this Article. Moreover, a private antitrust suit
against the CRS airlines is pending in federal district court. 318 However, a prima facie argument can be made, by applying relevant case
law to CAB findings of fact, that DOT has tolerated violations of the
antitrust laws by the CRS airlines. Although the CAB factual findings
rested on "substantial evidence, ''319 rather than the more rigorous "pre311. 49 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(9), (10) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
312. DOJ REPORT, supra note 56, at 21.
313. Id. at 10.
314. Id. at 19.
315. Pan Am. World Airways v. United States, 371 U.S. 296, 304 (1963).
316. Id. at 307.
317. Id.
318. In re Air Passenger Computer Reservations Sys. Antitrust Litig., No. MDL 667
(C.D. Cal. 1986). When this Article was published, the case was still pending, although
some issues have been resolved by motion. See, e.g., In re Air Passenger,727 F. Supp. 564
(C.D. Cal. 1989) (plantiffs have standing to bring monopolization claim under section 2 of
the Sherman Act but do not have standing to bring attempted monopolization claim;
plaintiffs' motion to reconsider denied); In re Air Passenger,724 F. Supp. 744 (C.D. Cal.
1989) (American Airlines obligated to pay Air Cal's attorneys' fees); In re Air Passenger,
1988-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 68,216 (C.D. Cal. 1988) (defendants granted summary judgment
on plaintiffs' claims under section 1 of the Sherman Act); In re Air Passenger,694 F.
Supp. 1443 (C.D. Cal. 1988) (defendants granted summary judgment on essential facilities
and monopoly leveraging theories; genuine issue of material fact existed concerning allegations of monopolization and attempted monopolization); In re Air Passenger,116 F.R.D.
390 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (plaintiffs' motion to compel granted).
319. 49 Fed. Reg. 32,540, at 32,542 (1984).
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ponderance of the evidence" test,3 20 and were made for the purpose of
prospective rulemaking rather than adjudication, 32 ' nonetheless, the
findings support such a prima facie case.
The CRS airlines may be monopolizing the CRS industry under
section 2 of the Sherman Act.3 2 2 In order to monopolize under the Act,
a firm must possess monopoly power in the relevant market3 23 and
must exercise the monopoly power.3 24 The opinion that accompanied
the 1984 CAB rules stated that the airlines did not necessarily have a
monopoly with regard to the national CRS market.3 25 However, the
3 26
opinion stated that the market to look at was the regional market,
and that the regional market was more concentrated than the national
market.3 27 Although the CAB did not analyze the CPS airlines' regional market shares, it seems probable, based on the CAB opinion, that
328
the CRS airlines possess monopoly power in the regional markets.
Antitrust case law suggests that the CRS airlines' behavior indicates that they possess monopoly power. In United States v. General
Electric Co., 329 General Electric Corporation (GE) engaged in industrial
surveillance of its rivals in the lamp market. GE believed that its rivals
were infringing GE patents, and accordingly, inspected its rivals' plants.
However, GE gathered additional information unrelated to patent infringement. 330 GE aggressively sought data regarding their rivals that
had only been available to government agencies. 331 In addition, GE recorded the number of lamp bases the competitors had bought from
GE 3 3 2 in order to predict how many lamps the rivals would put into the
market. 333 GE gathered all of its data at a central point in order to de320. See id.
321. Id.
322. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1978).
323. United States v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 118 F. Supp. 41, 195 (D. Del.
1953).
324. Id. at 50.
325. 49 Fed. Reg. 32,540, at 32,544 (1984). The report states:
DOJ's national market statistics show that SABRE agents account for 43 percent
of all domestic travel agent revenues, while APOLLO agents account for another
27 percent. These shares are lower than those courts generally recognize as indicating monopoly power. Nevertheless, given the nature of competition in CRS
and air transportation markets, the national shares suggests that the leading vendors have significant market power.
Id.
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Id. at 32,545.
329. 82 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1949).
330. Id. at 901.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Id.
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termine strategy that would enable GE to continue dominating the
lamp market.33 4 The court found that the behavior of GE was a mani3 5
festation of monopoly power. 3
The CRS airlines have engaged in behavior similar to that of GE.
They have engaged in industrial surveillance through the CRSs-gathering immediate information on the ticket sales of rivals. 336 They have
gathered raw data on computer tapes and collected the tapes at a central point in order to track the performances of non-CRS airlines. CRS
airlines have not made the computer tapes readily accessible to nonCRS airlines because the tapes are difficult to process. The CRS-airlines have used the immediate data and the computer tape data to develop strategies that will enable them to continue dominating the CRS
market. This behavior indicates monopoly power by the CRS airlines.
In order to exercise monopoly power under section 2 of the Sherman Act, a firm must willfully maintain the monopoly power-as distinguished from realizing growth attributable to a superior product,
business acumen, or historic accident.3 37 CRS airlines have probably
committed the exclusionary acts toward competition--an exercise of
monopoly power under section 2 of the Sherman Act-by engaging in
illegal price squeezing. An example of illegal price squeezing is provided by United States v. Aluminum Co. of America 338 (Alcoa).
In Alcoa, an aluminum company imposed a price squeeze on its
competitors by selling raw aluminum at a relatively high price, and by
selling its own processed aluminum at a relatively low price.339 In this
way, it denied independent aluminum processors the ability to obtain a
reasonable profit. 340 The Second Circuit held that this was an illegal
341
price squeeze.
CRS airlines are imposing a price squeeze on the independent CRS
market by charging low subscription prices to travel agents 34 2 in order
to gain enhanced ticket sales through the use of display bias and commission overrides. 343 Part of the profit that the CRS airlines gain is de344
rived from ticket sales attributable to control of the CRS market.
Profit from ticket sales is unavailable to independent CRS compa334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.

Id.
Id.
Senate Hearing,supra note 48, at 216-17 (prepared statement of M.E. Levine).
Marnell v. United Parcel Serv. of Am., 260 F. Supp. 391, 412 (N.D. Cal. 1966).
148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
Id. at 437.

340. Id. at 437-38.

341. Id. at 438.
342. Airline Competition, supra note 6, at 460.

343. Id.
344. Id. at 462.
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nies.345 Therefore, as in Alcoa, the CRS airlines are using their position
in one industry (airlines) to squeeze out independent operators in another industry (CRSs). Moreover, the CRS airlines use their resultant
market power in the CRS industry to gain further monopoly leverage
over the airline industry through display bias, commission overrides,
and industrial surveillance. 34
In order to constitute a section 2 offense, the monopoly must exist
in the relevant market.347 The CAB opinion found that the relevant
product market was CRS services and not airline ticket distribution
services.34 It also found that the relevant geographic market was regional and not national. 349 CRS airlines probably possess regional mo3 °
nopolies within the product market of CRS services.
The CRS airlines may also be monopolists under the essential facility doctrine.3 5 ' If a facility is essential in order to compete in a given
market, the owners of the facility are obligated to provide access to the
facility on a reasonable basis. 352 The CAB opinion found that CRSs are
an essential facility3 5 3 and promulgated new rules partially in response
to this finding.354 However, the CRS airlines have not provided reasonable access to the non-CRS airlines. 35 They have charged booking fees
that are well above cost 3 5 6 and have granted themselves superior access
3 57
to immediate market data obtainable through CRSs.
345. Id.
346. Senate Hearing,supra note 48, at 212-17 (prepared statement of M.E. Levine).
But see In re Air Passenger Computer Reservations Sys. Antitrust Litig., 694 F. Supp.
1443, 1472-75 (C.D. Cal. 1988) (defendant granted summary judgment in antitrust suit
against CRS airline alleging monopoly leveraging through use of CRS). The court stated
that, even though there was evidence indicating monopoly leveraging, "summary judgment on the monopoly leveraging claim would be appropriate because the theory is inconsistent with the requirements of section 2 [of the Sherman Antitrust Act]." Id. at 1475.
347. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 429.
348. 49 Fed. Reg. 32,540, at 32,544 (1984).
349. Id.
350. Cohen, The Antitrust Implications of Airline Deregulation, 28 ANTITRUST BULL.
131, 152-53 (1983).
351. 49 Fed. Reg. 32,540, at 32,546 (1984).
352. Southern Pac. Communications v. A.T.& T. 556 F. Supp. 825, 973 (D.D.C. 1983).
353. 49 Fed. Reg. 32,540, at 32,546 (1984). But see In re Air Passenger Computer Reservations Sys. Antitrust Litig., 694 F. Supp. 1443, 1452-56 (C.D. Cal. 1988) (SABRE CRS not
an essential facility because there are other computer reservation systems competing with
SABRE).
354. 49 Fed. Reg. 32,540, at 32,546 (1984).
355. DOJ REPORT, supra note 56, at 13-14.
356. Senate Hearing,supra note 48, at 207 (testimony of M.E. Levine).
357. Id. at 211.
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7. Incipient Antitrust Violations
Even if the CRS airlines are not committing actual violations of the
antitrust laws, they are violating the policy behind the laws. The policy
behind the antitrust laws is to preserve competition and to protect the
consumer against monopolies.3m DOT has the authority not only to
prohibit incipient violations of the antitrust laws, but also to prohibit violations of the policies behind the laws.3 9
Section 411 of the FAA Act 360 is analogous to section 45 of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act,3 1 which enables the FTC to prevent
incipient antitrust violations. 362 The FTC has found that practices similar to those engaged in by CRS airlines are incipient antitrust violations.
In FTC v. Texaco, s36 the Goodrich Tire Company paid commissions
to Texaco in exchange for Texaco's efforts to induce its service station
franchises to sell Goodrich tires, batteries, and accessories. 364 The FTC
held that Texaco's practice violated section 5 of the FTC Act.3 65
s The
Supreme Court upheld the FTC's decision,3 66 reasoning that Texaco exercised dominant market power over its franchises,3 7 and that Texaco's
use of its market power to induce the franchises to buy Goodrich tires,
batteries, and accessories foreclosed the market to independent distributors of tires, batteries, and accessories.3 8 The Court held that the standard under section 5 was not whether Texaco had violated the antitrust
laws, but whether Texaco's actions "unfairly burdened competition for
36 9
a not significant volume of commerce.
The CRS airlines' payments of commission overrides to travel
agents is analogous to Goodrich's payment of commissions to Texaco.
CRS airlines use profits from their increased ticket sales (which result
from CRS display bias) to pay commission overrides to agents.3 70 In do358.
1985).
359.
360.
361.

H.

HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAwS

50-51 (Lawyer ed.

See, e.g., 49 Fed. Reg. 32,540, at 32,542 (1984).
49 U.S.C.A. app. § 1381(West 1989).
Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 45 (West 1989); see also CAB

Rulemaking on Carrier-owned Computer Reservation Systems, 49 Fed. Reg. 32,540, at
32,542 (1984) "Section 411 [FAA Act], like section 5 [FTC Act] was meant to supplement
other antitrust statutes by stopping in their incipiency those methods of competition
which fall within the meaning of the word 'unfair.'" Id.

362. 15 U.S.C. § 45.
363. 393 U.S. 223 (1968).
364. Id. at 227.

365.
366.
367.
368.

Id. at 225.
Id. at 223.
Id.
Id. at 229.

369. Id. at 230.

370. Airline Competition, supra note 6, at 460.
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ing so, they foreclose the CRS market to independent CRS companies,
3 71
who are unable to gain incremental revenue from airline ticket sales.
But, despite this existence of a prima facie case of antitrust violation
against the CRS airlines, and despite the fact that CRS airlines have
clearly violated the policies behind the antitrust laws, DOT has not
brought an antitrust action against the CRS airlines.
C.

CRITICISM OF HOUSE RESPONSE

1. Airline Computer Reservation Systems ArbitrationAct
The Airline Computer Reservation Systems Arbitration Act contradicts the policy behind the Airline Deregulation Act, by reintroducing
extensive government regulation into the airline industry. Moreover,
mandatory arbitration might deter DOT enforcement of the policies of
the ADA. DOT would be less likely to enforce or promulgate rules concerning the CRSs in the midst of a government-enforced arbitration
concerning CRS contracts, for fear of inconsistent outcomes. For example, FMCS and DOT could develop-in separate proceedings--different
standards for the acceptable level of use that a CRS-airline could require of a travel agent under a minimum use clause of a contract. The
confusion resulting from concurrent jurisdiction by DOT and FMCS
over CRS contracts would make government regulation even more
ineffectual.
2. Airline PassengerProtectionAct
The House version of the Airline Passenger Protection Act attempts to protect the consumer by prohibiting the use of elapsed flying
times to determine the order-of-flight display on CRS screens, and by
prohibiting liquidated damages clauses in contracts between CRS airlines and travel agents. 372 Although this approach could have benefits,
the benefits would only be temporary. CRS airlines would be likely to
find other ways to achieve display bias, as they did in order to side step
the CAB rules.373 For example, CRS airlines probably would continue
to discriminate against non-CRS airlines' connecting flights. 374 Because
airline deregulation has given rise to the "hub and spoke system," 375
most air trips involve connections. Therefore, display bias against connecting flights would have a severe economic effect on non-CRS
371. Senate Hearing,supra note 48, at 109-10 (prepared statement of R.E. Murray).

372.
1987).
373.
374.
375.

H.R. 3051, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 18, 21, 133 CONG. REC. H8115-17 (daily ed. Oct. 5,
MORRISON, supra note 33, at 70.
Id. at 70 n.17.
Airline Competition, supra note 6, at 411.
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376

airlines.
Although eliminating liquidated damages clauses would reduce barriers to entry for new entrants into the CRS industry, this approach
would be insufficient because barriers to entry would continue to exist
as a result of revenues that CRS-owning airlines generate through display bias. 3 7 7 Further, even if eliminating liquidated damages clauses
378
would enable new airline-owned CRS companies to enter the market,
379
the new entrants would have an incentive to engage in display bias.
D.

CRITICISM OF THE SENATE RESPONSE

1. Airline PassengerProtection Act
The Senate version of the Airline Passenger Protection Act not
only regulates the manner in which CRSs' display information, it also
compels all airlines to provide certain information to the consumer. 38°
For instance, the bill requires that those who book flights from a CRS
screen inform consumers of flight delay and other information that
would be displayed on the screen. 381 However, the Senate version of
the Act is unlikely to adequately address the anti-competitive problem
of airline ownership of CRSs. The bill requires that flight delay information be provided to DOT. 3 s 2 This "paperwork" requirement could
unduly burden small, new entrant airlines which, unlike large airlines,
do not keep track of such information in the normal course of
38 3
business.
Furthermore, the bill might create new inefficiencies in the CRS
industry. 384 The software for CRSs may have to be changed in order to
load the information about delayed flights. 38 5 Also, including such information could lead to longer conversations between travel agents and
consumers, thus raising personnel costs. 3 8 6 More importantly, it would
be an example of the government requiring a service from private industry that the market may not demand.
376.
377.
378.
379.
380.
1987).
381.
382.
383.
384.

See MORRISON, supra note 33, at 70 .l17.
See Senate Hearing, supra note 48, at 218-20 (prepared statement of M.E. Levine).
Id.
Id.
S. 1485, 100th Cong, 2d Sess. 13-15, 133 CONG. REC. S15530-34 (daily ed. Oct. 30,
Id. at 6, 13, 133 CONG. REC. S15530.
Id. at 13, 133 CONG. REc. S15530-31.
S. REP. No. 138, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1987).
Id. at 7.

385. Id. at 6.

386. Id.
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2. Legislation From the Senate Antitrust Subcommittee
More satisfactory legislation does not appear to be forthcoming
from the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust, Monopolies, and Business
Rights. In hearings before the subcommittee, Chairman Senator Metzenbaum indicated that he favors informal negotiation with CRS airlines over a legislative solution. 387 However, informal negotiation is
unlikely to succeed in the face of the complexities presented by CRS
technology, and the large amount of money at stake for the CRS
airlines.
Further, Senator Metzenbaum indicated that if he were to introduce legislation, it would be in the form of regulation, such as the prohibition of liquidated damages clauses,3 88 rather than in the form of
enforced divestiture.389 Such regulation would reintroduce government
intervention into the airline industry, contrary to the policies behind
the Airline Deregulation Act.

E. OPTIONS OPEN TO CONGRESS
In view of DOT's failure to implement the policies of the ADA, and
to prevent market manipulation by CRS airlines and the resultant market concentration, Congress must act to protect the consumer. Congress has discussed three available options for remedying the anticompetitive effects of airline ownership of CRSs. Congress may: (1)
regulate airline use of CRSs,3 9° (2) urge DOT to engage in informal negotiation with the CRS airlines,39 1 or (3) pass legislation that would require CRS airlines to divest their CRSs. 392 Of these three options,
divestiture is the only satisfactory one.
1. Regulation
Regulation is not a satisfactory option. Regulation would by contrary to the policy of the Airline Deregulation Act, a major piece of legislation that is only seven years old. Also, regulation would deprive the
consumer of some of the benefits of deregulation; deregulation led to
393
customer savings and increased airline efficiency.
Further, CRS airlines have been successful in sidestepping regulations. They have avoided CAB rules against display bias through the
387. Senate Hearing, supra note 48, at 2 (opening statement of Sen. H.M.
Metzenbaum).
388. Id. at 151 (testimony of M.V. Scocozza).
389. Id. at 248-49 (panel discussion).
390. See, e.g., id., at 2 (opening statement of Sen. H.M. Metzenbaum).
391. See, e.g., id. at 152-53 (testimony of M.V. Scocozza).
392. See, e.g., id. at 2 (opening statement of Sen. H.M. Metzenbaum).
393. MORRISON, supra note 33, at 1-2.
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use of misleading devices such as false elapsed flying times. 394 In addition, CRS airlines sidestepped the CAB rules forbidding contracts with
travel agents lasting more than five years3

95

by instituting rollover

3 96

clauses in their contracts.
The CRS airlines have also avoided the
CAB rules against exclusivity clauses in their contracts by instituting
minimum use clauses. 39 7 Because the minimum use requirements they
imposed were so high, the clauses acted as de facto exclusivity
398
clauses.
In the face of CRS airlines' efforts to avoid regulatory requirements
and the rapid technological developments in the CRS industry, neither
DOT nor Congress have the ability to regulate quickly enough or extensively enough to adequately stem the anti-competitive effects of airline
ownership of

2.

CRSs.

3 99

Informal Negotiation

Informal negotiation between DOT and the CRS airlines is also not
a satisfactory option. The technical complexities of the CBS industry
and the ever-expanding capabilities of computers make the issue too
complicated to be resolved through informal negotiation. 4° ° Further,
since the CRS airlines have been successful in avoiding the CAB rules,
it is also likely that they would be successful in avoiding any informal
agreement entered into with DOT. 4 0 ' In view of the large economic in-

terests that the CRS airlines have at stake, and in view of the past behavior of the CRS airlines, good faith negotiation by the CRS airlines
seems unlikely.
3. Divestiture
a.

Congressionalpower to legislate divestiture, and policy arguments
in favor of divestiture

Divestiture is the only option open to Congress that is likely to stop
the anti-consumer effects of airline-owned CRSs. Although divestiture
is a remedy that is most often used by the courts, Congress has the
power to require divestiture under the Constitution's Commerce
Clause.40 2 Divestiture would be the most cost-effective option, because
394. Senate Hearing,supra note 48, at 101-02 (prepared statement of R.E. Murray).
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.
400.
401.
402.

Id. at 104.
Id.
Id. at 261 (prepared statement of C.L. Bryant).
Id.
Id. at 193 (prepared statement of E.R. Beauvais).
See id.
See id. at 194.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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it would eliminate the continuing need to regulate and supervise the
CRS industry against further display bias. 40 3 Independent CRS companies would not have the incentive that CRS airlines have to distort
flight information and to charge supra-competitive booking fees; 40 4 independent CRS companies would not compete with airlines to sell tickets and to gain market power in the airline industry.40 5 Moreover,
consumers would gain substantial benefits because they would have easier access to information regarding any less expensive and more convenient flights offered by non-CRS airlines. 4° 6 In addition, divestiture
would eliminate the competitive advantage that CRS airlines maintain
40 7
by monitoring the sales of non-CRS airlines and travel agents.
Divestiture would also allow non-airline companies to enter into
the CRS market more easily. 40 8 Independent CRS companies are currently unable to compete against airline-owned CRS companies because
the airline-owned CRS companies, unlike the non-airline companies,
are able to exchange lower CRS profits for the higher volume of fare
profits that result from display bias. 4° 9 Divestiture would also reduce
barriers that now exist for non-CRS owning airlines, because CRS air410
lines could no longer gain sales through the use of display bias.
Some argue that independent, non-airline-owned, CRS companies
would operate at a loss if they charged the same booking fees as existing CRS companies, and would consequently fail-leaving consumers
without the benefits of CRS technology. 41 ' This argument is unpersuasive. Although independent CRS companies would not gain incremental revenues from sales of airline tickets, 412 they could raise travel
agent subscription rates. These subscription rates would not be supracompetitive because competition between the independent CRS companies would keep the rates down. Travel agents have come to rely on the
CRS to serve their customers. 4 13 Demand would continue among travel
agents for CBS services and independent CRS companies would be able
to make a profit. 414 Moreover, increased subscription rates to travel
403. Airline Competition,supra note 6, at 489.

404. Senate Hearing,supra note 48, at 208 (testimony of M.E. Levine).
405. Id.
406. See id. at 185-86 (prepared statement of E.R. Beauvais).

407. Id. at 216-17 (prepared statement of M.E. Levine).
408. Airline Competition, supra note 6, at 488-89.
409. Id. at 460.
410. Id. at 488-89.
411. See, e.g., 49 Fed. Reg. at 32,560; Senate Hearing,supra note 48, at 245-47 (panel
discussion).
412. Senate Hearing,supra note 48, at 208 (testimony of M.E. Levine).
413. Id. at 212.
414. Id. at 245 (panel discussion).
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agents should not result in higher costs to consumers.4 15 First, competition between independent CRS companies would keep subscription
rates reasonably priced.416 Second, consumers would save money due to
their improved access to information with regard to both inexpensive
4 17
flights and more convenient connecting flights.
Opponents of divestiture also argue that the CRS airlines should
not be deprived of their CRS systems because they took the risk of developing the CRS.418

However, the CRS airlines were able to develop

the CRS, in part, because of advantages conferred by the government. 419 United and American were granted nationwide routes by the
CAB under regulation, 42° and, therefore, were among the most profitable regulated airlines. 421 Because of this economic advantage, United
and American had the capital required to develop the CRS.4 2 2 Moreover, under regulation, the entire airline industry had started to develop an industry-wide computer reservation system. 423 However,
United and American pulled out of the industry effort and developed
their own display-biased systems, using the economic advantage conferred on them by the government. 42 4 Because of these circumstances,
concern for the consumer should be paramount, and Congress should
require divestiture, accompanied by fair compensation to the CRS
airlines.
The reasons cited against divestiture in the DOJ report are unpersuasive. Admittedly, divestiture would result in the duplication of
software, hardware, staff, and telecommunications lines.42 5 These duplications could destroy efficiencies that may exist as a result of airline
ownership of CRSs. On the other hand, independent companies that
own CRSs would have the incentive to develop more efficient software,
hardware, and staffing techniques. The airline-owned CRS companies
do not seem to have the same incentives-their goal has appeared to be
to gain more passengers by manipulating the CRS-and thus might not
42 6
make the CRS as efficient as an independent company would.
415. See id. at 249-50.
416. See id.
417. See id.
418. Id. at 35 (prepared statement of M.A. Buckman).
419. Airline Competition, supra note 6, at 459.
420. Id. at 426.
421. House Hearing,supra note 244, at 55-56 (prepared statement of Victor Rezendes,
Associate Director, Resources, Community, and Economic Development Division, United
States General Accounting Office).
422. Id.
423. Id. at 459-60.
424. Id. at 460.
425. DOJ REPORT, supra note 56, at 69.
426. See Senate Hearing, supra note 48, at 249 (testimony of M.E. Levine).
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DOJ argued that divestiture would be impracticable, because there
would be no benchmark for competition to the CRS airlines, should
they be ordered to divest their CRSs. 4 2

7

However, DOT could develop a

formula for compensation based on the amount of money invested in
the CRS, the amount of profit earned by the CRS, and the risk undertaken by the CRS airlines in developing the CRS. Moreover, should
compensation be difficult to compute, DOT could require that the independent companies pay residual royalties to the CRS airlines for a
specified time.
The DOJ report also argued that the problem of bias might not be
solved by divestiture. The report indicated that travel agents might
seek biased systems from the independent CRS companies, so that the
agents could obtain commission overrides from the dominant airlines in
the travel agent's regional market.428 However, this problem could be
solved by prohibiting commission overrides.
Divestiture is not unprecedented where vertical integration of powerful corporations has harmed consumers by reducing competition. In
Ford Motor Company v. United States,429 Ford acquired Autolite, a
spark plug company. 430 The spark plug industry was concentrated at
the time of Ford's entry into the market. 43 1 Profits in the spark plug

industry were made not through the first sale of a plug to a car manufacturer, but through replacement sales to the buyer of the car.432 The
initial sales were made at cost, or below cost, in order to insure replacement sales, on which profits were made.4 3 3 The Supreme Court ordered

divestiture, 34 reasoning that auto company ownership of a spark plug
company created entry barriers to the spark plug market, because the
auto company would obtain replacement sales of its spark plugs by in-

4
stalling them in its new cars. 3

The Court noted that Ford's entry into the spark plug market denied independent spark plug manufacturers access to Ford as a customer.436 The Court also noted that divestiture was the only effective
43 7
remedy to restore competition in the spark plug market.
In Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland,43 8 the Maryland legisla427.
428.
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ture required that national oil products divest themselves of service stations in Maryland. 43 9 The Maryland legislature passed the statute
because the oil producers had given their service stations preferential
treatment in the distribution of gasoline during the gas shortage of the
early 1970s. 440 Thus, the statute was passed to correct the inequities of
distribution, 44 1 and to preserve competition in the service station
industry. 442
The policies behind the Ford and Exxon decisions apply to airline
ownership of CRSs as well. Airline ownership of CRSs creates barriers
for independent CRS companies wanting to enter the CRS market because the independent companies cannot gain revenues that CRS airlines gain through increased airline bookings. 443 Also, given that the
dominant air carriers are, themselves, in the CRS industry, independent
CRS companies are deprived of the opportunity to serve their largest
potential customers. 44 Airline ownership of CRSs creates other barriers for non-CRS airlines trying to enter the CRS market because nonCRS airlines are unable to gain increased sales through CRS display
bias.44 5 Barriers to entry in both of these industries decrease competition and, thus, harm the consumer. 446
b.

The example of the AT&T divestiture.

The divestiture of AT&T provides an example of consumer benefits
that can be gained by divesting a monopoly. The AT&T experience can
also provide Congress with a map for avoiding possible pitfalls of
divestiture.
After a protracted antitrust suit brought by DOJ, AT&T and DOJ
entered into a consent decree in 1982, 44 7 in which AT&T agreed to
divest its regional operating companies-companies that provided local
telephone service to consumers.4" Under the decree, AT&T split into
eight corporate entities. 449 DOJ had brought the antitrust suit because
it believed that AT&T was cross-subsidizing its competitive activities in
the long distance market with revenues that it gained in the regulated,
439. Id.
440. Id.
441. Id. at 121.
442. Id.
443. Senate Hearing,supra note 48, at 146 (statement of M.V. Scocozza).
444. Id.
445. Id.
446. Id. at 276-77 (prepared statement of D.A. Swankin).
447. United States v. A.T.& T., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982); see also McKenna &
Slyter, The Modification of Final Judgment: An Exercise in JudicialOverkill, 9 Comm./
ENT. L.J. 9, 10 (1986).
448. A.T& T, 552 F. Supp. at 131.
449. McKenna, supra note 447, at 10.
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monopolistic, local telephone service market. 45o Therefore, under the
decree, AT&T agreed to provide only long distance services and to delegate local service contracts to divested Bell Operating Companies
45
(BOCs). 1
Many predicted that the divestiture would destroy the telephone
system and drastically raise the costs of local service. 452 Others predicted that divestiture would be technologically impossible for the integrated phone system. 453 However, the divestiture caused no significant
damage to the telephone system. 454 Admittedly, local rates did increase
after divestiture because local companies used divestiture as an excuse
for rate increases; however, local rates are expected to decline over time
because of advances in technology and the development of the competition that will stem from the divestiture. 455 Moreover, technological in456
tegration did not prevent the divestiture.
The success of the divestiture can be attributed to the planning
strategy of AT&T's management. 4 57 The consent decree provided for
divestiture within two years. 458 After the signing of the consent decree,
high level task groups comprised of executives from AT&T and the local operating companies framed general guidelines for the divestiture,
which they called an "assumption set." 459 They sent copies of the assumption set to experts in various subject matter areas of AT&T;46° the
experts returned the assumption sets to the high level task groups with
recommendations and amendments. 46 ' After the experts' recommendations had been considered, the high level task force delegated implementation of the assumption set to lower level joint task forces.462
The joint task groups provided guidelines to the BOCs on how to
structure themselves as divested companies. 463 The guidelines gave directions on how to divide assets between AT&T and the BOCs, and how
450. A. T & T, 552 F. Supp. at 223.
451. W. TUNSTALL, DISCONNECTING PARTIES, MANAGING THE BELL SYSTEM BREAK-UP:
AN INSIDE VIEW 16-17 (1985).
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to divide customer accounts. 464 As the date for divestiture approached,
interdisciplinary boards and committees formed to coordinate the efforts of AT&T and the BOCs. 465 Also, a "restructure implementation
board" formed to resolve disputes within the committees. 466
The high level task force tracked the progress of the divestiture
with two central computers and complex charts, located in central management rooms. 4 6 7 Through the process of delegation, the high level
task force guided the drafting of a plan of reorganization,468 as well as
the development of detailed instructions to employees on how to implement the plan; they then held a trial run of the plan. 469 After addressing the problems that occurred during the trial run, AT&T and the
BOCs opened for business as separate corporations on January 1, 1984,
as planned. 470 Thus, despite predictions of disaster, AT&T divested its
471
BOCs without harm to the telephone industry.
Divestiture led to many benefits. Consumers were given a wider
choice in equipment and service. 47 2 Managers in the BOCs had more incentive to excel, because top positions in the smaller BOCs were more
473
accessible in the newly-formed, smaller, independent companies.
Also, AT&T became free to compete in the computer industry as well
as in the long distance telephone industry (which had been prohibited
under an earlier consent decree between AT&T and DOJ), making it
possible for AT&T to participate in the development of new interdisci4 74
plinary technology.
However, the divestiture of AT&T also created some problems.
The regulated BOCs used the divestiture as an excuse to request rate
hikes for local service. 475 The quality of long distance service from
AT&T decreased for a time because new formalized procedures impeded coordination between AT&T and BOCs which, prior to the divestiture, utilized less formal intercorporation procedures. 476 Many
consumers were unaware that the divestiture had occurred, and they
464.
465.
466.
467.
468.
469.
470.
471.
472.
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continued to expect all phone service to come from one source.4 7 7 Consumers also became frustrated when they were unable to determine
which company (AT&T or one of the BOCs) was responsible for service
in a given situation. 478 Further, despite the assumption of DOJ that the
divestiture would lead to less regulation from the FCC, the FCC continued to regulate AT&T in the long distance market.4 79 Moreover, Judge
Green's enforcement of the consent decree led to regulation conflicts
with the FCC.48° The confusion that arose from the conflict in jurisdiction between the district court and the FCC hindered AT&T's attempt
to develop new technology in the restructured telecommunications industry.48 1 This jurisdictional conflict ended up causing so much confusion that Congress declined to intervene with legislation, for fear of
making matters worse and then having to take the blame from constituents.48 2 Thus, although divestiture of AT&T led to some benefits for
48 3
consumers, it did not provide all the benefits that some had hoped.
However, the problems that have beset the AT&T divestiture are
unlikely to occur in a legislative divestiture of CRSs by CRS airlines for
the reasons that follow. First, one of the problems with the AT&T consent decree was that the FCC and Congress were not included in the
negotiations between DOJ and AT&T over the consent decree. 48 4 Thus,
AT&T did not obtain a commitment to deregulation of long distance
service in exchange for divesting the BOCs.48 5 On the other hand, in a
legislative divestiture of CRSs from CRS airlines, Congress would have
control over the entire process. Therefore, Congress could draft a divestiture bill so that conflicts would not arise between the executive
and the judicial branches. In addition, the bill would be drafted so that
the market, rather than regulation, would determine price and service
in the CRS industry. Moreover, because CRS access rates would be determined by the market, and not by state regulatory agencies subject to
political pressures, the CRS access rates to travel agents in a divested
market would not escalate unreasonably, as did some local telephone
rates.
Second, consumer expectations of the CRS industry are less entrenched than consumer expectations of the telephone industry. The
CRS is a relatively new device. The telephone, on the other hand, is a
477.
478.
479.
480.
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483.
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part of the fabric of everyday life, and, before the AT&T divestiture,
4
consumers were used to "one stop shopping" for telephone service. W
To be sure, travel agents may by now have come to depend on CRS
services that are integrated into airline service. However, the average
consumer has not developed a reliance on an integrated airline and CRS
industry. Moreover, the confusion that arose in the minds of consumers
during the AT&T divestiture about who was responsible for service is
less likely to arise in a divested CRS industry, because reservation services are substantially different from airline service.
Thus, as proved by AT&T, divestiture is logistically feasible in
large, complex, technological industries. In order to implement a congressionally mandated divestiture, the CPS airlines could imitate the
strategies of AT&T. Further, the inefficiencies that arose in the telephone industry because of jurisdictional conflicts between the FCC and
the district court would not arise as a result of a legislative divestiture.
As a participant in the AT&T divestiture observed, Congress, rather
than a court, is better equipped to structure a divestiture plan for the
communications industry, in order to avoid such jurisdictional
conflicts.

48 7

F. POSSIBLE CONSTITUTIONAL OBJECTIONS TO DIVESTITURE AS A
LEGISLATIVE REMEDY

Two possible constitutional objections to enforced divestiture exist:
(1) enforced divestiture might constitute an unconstitutional taking; and
(2) enforced divestiture would be a denial of due process to CRS airlines. Neither of these arguments is persuasive.
1.

Taking

Under the United States Constitution, the government may not
take property without just compensation.48 8 Even if the government
provides just compensation, the taking is unconstitutional if it is not for
48 9
a public purpose.
There is little doubt that divestiture would be a taking, and not a
mere regulation, given that a governmental action which is a permanent
physical invasion of private property is a per se taking under the Constitution. 49° Therefore, like a person whose property is taken, the CRS
airlines would be entitled to compensation under a statutory divestiture
486. Id. at 128.
487. W. TUNSTALL, supra note 451, at 194.

488. Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 231 (1984).
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plan.
A divestiture statute would satisfy the "public purpose" test under
the Constitution. In Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff 4 92 the
Supreme Court set forth the criteria for a "public purpose" taking. In
Midkiff, the Hawaii legislature had exercised its eminent domain power
to transfer land from large landowners to non-landowners. 493 Before
the transfer, seventy-two private landowners owned forty-seven percent
of the land, a result of a feudal system that had existed in Hawaii before
colonization. 494 Many attempts had been made over several generations
to redistribute the land.495 In 1967, the Hawaii legislature declared that
concentration of land ownership skewed the real estate market, inflated
land prices, and injured the public welfare. 496 The legislature passed
the Land Reform Act of 1967, 4 9 7 which condemned land in the hands of
large land owners and transferred it to the tenants of the land. 498 The
large landowners, although compensated for the fair market value of
the land, 4 9 9 challenged the Land Reform Act in federal court, contending that the Act was an unconstitutional taking because it was not for a
public purpose, but rather transferred property from one private group
to another private group. 5 0° In an opinion by Justice Douglas, the
Supreme Court upheld the Act, indicating that because it was "rationally related to a conceivable public purpose," it was allowable under the
state's police power.,5 1 The opinion declared that courts must impose a
narrow review over a legislative determination that a taking is for a
public purpose. 50 2 The Court also indicated that when a market malfunctions because of oligopoly power, state condemnation of property
that has become concentrated in the hands of a few to the detriment of
the population is a rational goal. 5 3 The Court noted that "public use"
does not require that the government possess and use property at some
point during a taking.5 04 A public purpose 5° 5 may exist even if property
is transferred directly from one private owner to another private
491.
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owner.
As in Midkiff, legislative divestiture would be a public purpose taking. Divestiture is a rational means of protecting the public from the
effects of a concentrated airline industry. Just as the Hawaii Legislature reallocated land that had fallen into the hands of a few landowners, Congress should reallocate access to information, an important
resource that has fallen into the hands of a small group because of benefits conferred by the government.
Further, the Supreme Court has held that, provided there is a public purpose, the work product of one private owner may be transferred
to another private owner as a constitutional taking. In Rucke shaus v.
Monsanto,5° 7 Congress had passed a statute authorizing the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to consider data already filed with the
EPA in a registrant's application to market pesticide, provided that, if a
later registrant relied in its application on data paid for by an earlier
registrant, the later registrant compensated the earlier registrant for
use of the data.508 Monsanto challenged the statute, claiming that it imposed an unconstitutional taking, since the taking was for private rather
than public use.50 9 The Supreme Court upheld the legislation, 510 reasoning that the taking was for the public purposes of (1) eliminating
barriers to entry for new pesticide companies, 511 and (2) streamlining
registration procedures so that consumers could receive products more
5 12
quickly.
Divestiture would involve the transfer of CRSs, which the CRS airlines developed, into the hands of private companies. However, this
transfer would be for the public purpose of preserving competition in
the airline industry, and, therefore, would be a constitutional taking.
2. Due Process
The CRS airlines' rights to contract with travel agents and with
non-CRS airlines, as protected by the due process clause, would not be
violated by divestiture legislation. Congressional power to legislate can5 13
not be denied merely because of the existence of private contracts.
Moreover, divestiture would not deprive the CRS airlines of sub506. Id.
507. 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
508. Id. at 992.
509. Id. at 999.
510. Id. at 1020.
511. Id. at 1014.
512. Id. at 1015.
513. See United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 25 (1977); see also Norman
v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 294 U.S. 240, 307-08 (1935).
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5 14
stantive due process. In Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland,
in
which the Maryland legislature required national oil producers to divest
themselves of service stations in Maryland. The United States Supreme
Court disposed of Exxon's substantive due process objections in one paragraph, stating that the Court should not act as a super-legislature to
weigh the wisdom of legislation when the legislature was serving a legitimate purpose of controlling the state's gasoline market, and when
5 15
the statute was reasonably related to the state's program.
Exxon will govern any time there is a constitutional challenge to
congressionally mandated divestiture of CRSs by CRS airlines. Congress has the legitimate purpose of protecting the consumer from abuse
of the CRSs by the CRS airlines, and divestiture would be a reasonable
means of achieving the public purpose.

VI. CONCLUSION
Consumers are suffering serious injury because of airline ownership of CRSs. Congress should protect the consumer from exploitation
by CRS airlines by enacting legislation which will force CRS airlines to
divest themselves of their CRSs. Although a private antitrust suit
pending against the CRS airlines could eventually lead to judicially ordered divestiture, such relief may not be forthcoming for many years.
Congress should act now. Divestiture would not be an unconstitutional
taking, nor would it deny due process to the CRS airlines, provided that
the CRS airlines were fairly compensated for their investment. Divestiture would insure that the consumer finally receives the full benefits of
airline deregulation.
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